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« Interactions stratégiques dans les organisations collectives »
un symposium en mémoire de Louis-André Gérard-Varet
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core
in Exchange Economies With and Without Indivisibilities
Françoise Forges ∗
Summary
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange econ-
omy with private information is the (standard) core of a char-
acteristic function which expresses the fact that coalitions
allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible
mechanisms.
We first survey some results in the case of perfectly divisi-
ble goods. Examples then show that the ex ante incentive
compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions
are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further
assumptions are made (like independent private values),
the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet’s construction of incentive
compatible, ex post efficient mechanisms.
We also introduce a private information version of Shapley
and Scarf’s economies with indivisible goods, and prove that
the ex ante incentive compatible core is always non-empty
in this framework.
∗. CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine. Paper prepared for the conference in the memory of
Louis-André Gérard-Varet “Strategic Interactions in Industrial and Social Organizations”, CORE, January
24-25, 2003. I wish to thank E. Minelli for numerous helpful discussions and H. Stahn for comments.
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Résumé
Le cœur ex ante incitatif d’une économie d’échange en
information incomplète est le cœur, au sens de la théorie
des jeux coopératifs standard, d’une fonction caractéristique
qui rend compte du fait que les coalitions allouent les biens
grâce à des mécanismes aléatoires incitatifs.
Nous passons d’abord en revue quelques résultats dans le
cas de biens parfaitement divisibles. Des exemples montrent
alors que le cœur ex ante incitatif peut être vide, même si
les fonctions d’utilité sont quasi-linéaires. Si, en plus de
la quasi-linéarité, on formule des hypothèses supplémen-
taires, telles que les valeurs privées et indépendantes, on
peut établir la non-vacuité du cœur en construisant des
mécanismes incitatifs efficaces ex post, suivant la méthode
de d’Aspremont et Gérard-Varet.
Nous introduisons également de l’ information incomplète
dans les économies avec biens divisibles de Shapley et Scarf
et nous démontrons que le cœur ex ante incitatif est toujours
non-vide dans ce cadre.
Keywords: Core, incentive compatible mechanism, indivisible
goods, private information.
Mots clés : Biens indivisibles, cœur, information incomplète, mé-
canisme incitatif.
J.E.L. : C78, C71, D82
1. Introduction
In most collective decision problems, agents have private information on
parameters entering their own utility functions as well as the others’. There is often
a preliminary stage, the ex ante stage, at which agents do not know their precise
information yet but share a common prior probability distribution on possible type
profiles. At the later interim stage, agents learn their own types and consequently
update their probability distribution over the others’ types.
An ex ante stage typically happens when decisions are made up by repre-
sentative institutions such as States. Consider for instance the application of the
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“precautionary principle” to public health issues. A mechanism is typically designed
at the ex ante stage, before individuals privately know their own state of health,
and implemented at the interim stage (e.g., by requiring a test from the individuals).
As another example, consider those States like Norway, Switzerland, etc. which are
not members of the European Union but are “associated” to it. When they decide
whether to participate in a particular E.U. program of scientific cooperation and
how much to invest in case they participate, they do not know precisely what the
quality of the applicants (laboratories, students, etc. including the national ones)
will be but only have statistical data.
If an ex ante stage is available and binding agreements are feasible, as is
assumed in classical cooperative game theory, the agents commit themselves in
advance to a mechanism (i.e., a collective strategy to select decisions as functions of
the agents’ types), and implement this mechanism at the interim stage. Since types
constitute private information at this interim stage, one must impose incentive
constraints in order to guarantee that truthful revelation be a Nash equilibrium
in the game induced by the mechanism. By the well-known revelation principle,
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms suffice to describe any Nash equilibrium
of any non-cooperative game that the agents could design in order to exchange
information and make collective decisions. There is obviously no reason to forbid
mixed strategies in these general non-cooperative games so that one also has to
consider random mechanisms – namely, lotteries selecting collective decisions as
functions of the agents’ reported types.
If the underlying environment does not involve externalities, e.g., if it consists
of an exchange economy with private information, incentive compatible mecha-
nisms can be chosen not only by the group as a whole, but also by coalitions of
agents. At least coalitions can pose a threat. A natural stability requirement (in
addition to Pareto efficiency) is then that the grand coalition’s incentive compatible
mechanism be not blocked by any smaller coalition, i.e., that no subgroup can
design an incentive compatible mechanism yielding a higher expected utility to
all its members. This amounts to saying that the grand coalition’s mechanism is
in the core of a suitably defined characteristic function. We refer to this core as
the “ex ante incentive compatible core”. In the public health example, mechanisms
through which all the participants stay together make good sense, because of
potential insurance effects. Natural coalitions might emerge at the ex ante stage:
for instance, individuals who are unlikely to be infected by the underlying desease
might not accept to cooperate. Solutions in the ex ante incentive compatible core
take all these threats into account, while favoring information revelation by means
of appropriate compensation schemes.
In the sequel, we focus on the ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange
economy with private information. In section 3, we first survey some results
in standard Walrasian economies (i.e., with perfectly divisible goods and non-
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transferable utility). An example in Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) shows that
in that model, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty. However, Forges
and Minelli (2001) establish a positive result when no good is initially owned by
two different agents and utility functions are additively separable across goods.
We introduce particular N.T.U. economies with indivisible goods which extend
Shapley and Scarf (1974)’s model to incomplete information. Every agent initially
owns at most one indivisible item, e.g., a house, and possibly some money. Every
agent has preferences over all items, which depend on the available information,
but can only make use of a single item. These economies are not a strict particular
case of Forges and Minelli’s ones but are close to them. We give here a direct
proof of the non-emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core in this
model. We first show that we can, without loss of generality, restrict ourselves to
“straightforward” mechanisms, whose outcomes are, for every agent, the probability
of getting any given item, together with an expected amount of money. We then
rely on Scarf (1967)’s theorem.
In section 4, we turn to exchange economies in which unlimited monetary
transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. As in the N.T.U.
case, Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002) provide an example of an economy with
perfectly divisible goods in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is empty.
The example is shown to be robust but features a fully informed agent and
common values. As first shown by d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982), if interim monetary transfers are possible,
appropriate assumptions on the prior beliefs and/or the utility functions (e.g.,
independent private values) make first best solutions achievable in a Bayesian
incentive compatible way. By relying on this result, one can establish the non-
emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core in several classes of T.U.
exchange economies.
We also consider unlimited monetary transfers in the economies with indivisible
goods introduced in section 3. The resulting model is then an extension of Shapley
and Shubik (1972)’s assignment game. Though not needed for the non-emptiness
result, transfers still play an important role in this model, by making it possible to
achieve first best allocations. This is illustrated by means of a detailed example.
Section 5 concludes with further observations on interim solution concepts.
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2. Basic Definitions
An exchange economy with private information consists of
– a set of agents N = {1, ...,n}
– l goods (each of which is either perfectly divisible or indivisible)
– for every agent i ∈N : a finite set of types Ti, a consumption set Ci ⊆R
l
+, an
initial endowment ei ∈ Ci and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui : T ×Ci → R, where T =
∏
i∈N Ti. ui(t, .) is assumed to be continuous and
increasing for every t ∈ T .
– a probability distribution q over T , such that without loss of generality,
q(ti) > 0 for every ti ∈ Ti.
Notice that consumption sets and initial endowments are independent of private
information.
We assume that at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the agents are informed of their
types, each subset of agents (or coalition) S ⊆N , S , ∅, can decide on a mechanism
µS, which will only be implemented at the interim stage (i.e., when every agent
knows his type) if S has formed.
Let XS be the set of feasible allocations:
XS =
x ∈
∏
i∈S
Ci :
∑
i∈S
xi ≤
∑
i∈S
ei
 (1)
and let ∆(XS) be the set of all probability distributions over XS. A (random
1,
feasible) mechanism for S is a mapping µS : T → ∆(XS) such that µS is measurable
w.r.t. TS =
∏
i∈S Ti, namely µS(t) = µS(t
′) for every t, t′ ∈ T : tS = t
′
S
.
As usual, the interpretation is that every member of S has to tell his type ti
to the mechanism, which selects a feasible allocation in XS as a function of the
reported types. In order to define incentive compatibility, assume that agent i ∈ S,
of type ti, pretends that his type is t
′
i
possibly different from ti. His expected utility
from µS is then
Ui(µS|ti, t
′
i ) =
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)
∫
XS
ui(ti, t–i,xi)dµS(x|t
′
i , t–i) (2)
Let us denote as Ui(µS|ti) the (interim) expected utility of agent i when he truthfully
reports his type to µS, namely
Ui(µS|ti) =Ui(µS|ti, ti)
1. We allow for lotteries and free disposal. As shown in Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) and Forges,
Mertens and Vohra (2002), both assumptions can be helpful in the presence of incentive constraints.
Lotteries may already play a role under complete information (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez,
1988; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2002; Garrat and Qin, 1996; Hylland
and Zeckhauser, 1979).
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µS is incentive compatible (I.C.) if
Ui(µS|ti) ≥Ui(µS|ti, t
′
i ) for every i ∈ S, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti (3)
Finally, Ui(µS) denotes the ex ante expected utility of agent i ∈ S, that is
Ui(µS) =
∑
ti
q(ti)Ui(µS|ti)
We associate the following (N.T.U.) characteristic function with the economy 2:
V ∗(S) =
{
v ∈Rn : ∃ an I.C. mechanism µS s.t. Ui(µS) ≥ vi ∀i ∈ S
}
V ∗ is well-behaved: for every S, V ∗(S) is closed, convex (thanks to random
mechanisms) and comprehensive. The ex ante incentive compatible core of the
economy is defined as the (standard) core C(V ∗) of V ∗, namely as the set of all
vector payoffs v ∈V ∗(N ) that cannot be blocked by any coalition (i.e., there does
not exist S and w ∈V ∗(S) such that wi > vi for every i ∈ S).
3. N.T.U. Economies
3.1. Perfectly Divisible Goods
We capture perfectly divisible goods by setting Ci = R
l
+ for every i ∈ N and
denote the corresponding economy as Ediv = {N , (Ti,ui,ei)i∈N ,q}. In this context,
Forges, Mertens and Vohra’s counterexample (see Forges, Mertens and Vohra,
2002, section 6) demonstrates that there is no hope for a general result on the
non-emptiness of C(V ∗). Nevertheless, by focusing on utility functions that are
additively separable across goods, i.e., such that
ui(t,xi) =
l∑
r=1
uri (t,x
r
i ) ∀i ∈N , t ∈ T ,xi ∈R
l
+
for some continuous, increasing functions ur
i
(t, .) : R+ → R, Forges and Minelli
(2001) established the following
Proposition 3.1 – If in Ediv no good is initially owned by two different agents
(i.e., er
i
> 0⇒ er
j
= 0 for every i, j ∈N ,r = 1, ..., l) and utility functions are additively
separable across goods, the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
Linear utility functions are obviously additively separable across goods. Fur-
thermore, starting with arbitrary initial endowments, we can rename the goods
2. As in Holmström and Myerson (1983), “*” reminds of incentive compatibility.
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according to their initial owner (i.e., good r initially owned by agent i becomes
good ri) and re-express the utility functions in terms of the new goods. These
utility functions are still linear. Hence
Corollary 3.1 – If in Ediv utility functions are linear, the ex ante incentive
compatible core is non-empty.
Obviously the corollary still holds with deterministic mechanisms µS : T → XS;
this result was identified by many authors (see Forges, Minelli and Vohra, 2002).
Random mechanisms are however crucial in proposition 3.1.
3.2. Indivisible Goods
Let us turn to a particular case of the economies introduced in section 2. We set
l = k+1 and K = {1, ...,k}; goods in K are indivisible items (e.g., houses) while good
l is perfectly divisible (e.g., money). We assume k ≤ n. Agent i’s consumption set is
Ci = {0,1}
k×R+. His initial endowment ei ∈ Ci satisfies: e
r
i
= 1 if r = i ∈ K, er
i
= 0 if
r ∈ K but r , i , el
i
≥ 0. In other words, there are k different, indivisible items; every
agent k ∈ K initially owns exactly one item; all agents may own some money.
We will focus on particular utility functions, which express that every agent
only cares for a single item and that his favorite item depends on the n-tuple of
types t. Let wr
i
(t) ≥ 0 be real numbers representing the utility of item r to agent i
when the types are t. We set, for xi ∈ Ci,
ui(t,xi) = max
r∈K
{
wri (t)I
[
xri = 1
]}
+ xli (4)
where I denotes the indicator function. Observe that these utility functions are not
additively separable across goods (except for money). We denote the economy just
described as Eind =
{
N ,K, (Ti,w
r
i
(.))i∈N ,r∈K ,q
}
.
According to (1),
XS =

x = (
[
xr
i
]
1≤i≤n,1≤r≤k
, (xl
i
)1≤i≤n) ∈ {0,1}
n×k×R+ :∑n
i=1 x
r
i
≤ 1 r = 1, ...,k
∑n
i=1 x
l
i
≤
∑n
i=1 e
l
i
 (5)
A feasible allocation x thus consists of an n×k matrix
[
xr
i
]
, each entry of which
is 0 or 1, and an allocation of the divisible good. xr
i
= 1 if item r is allocated to
agent i, xr
i
= 0 otherwise. Since there is exactly one item r in the economy, there is
at most one “1” in every column r. However, at this point, several items may be
allocated to the same agent.
Leaving aside incomplete information, the previous model is more general than
Shapley and Scarf (1974)’s one, because it possibly involves a perfectly divisible
good (in Shapley and Scarf, 1974, el
i
= 0 for every i), but less general than Quinzii
(1984)’s one, where the utility functions are not necessarily separable in money.
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The specific form of the economy Eind allows for a very tractable character-
ization of I.C. mechanisms, which are originally defined as in section 2. For
simplicity, we focus on the grand coalition N . We first introduce a particular class
of mechanisms, which we call straightforward; then we show that, without loss of
generality, one can focus on straightforward mechanisms.
A straightforward mechanism associates with every t ∈ T an n×k substochastic
matrix pi(t) and a deterministic allocation m(t) of the divisible good l. The first
condition means that the entries of pi(t) are non-negative and that the sum of
the entries in each row and each column is less than one 3. More precisely, the
feasibility conditions for a straightforward mechanism (pi,m) are
piri (t) ≥ 0, mi(t) ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,n, r = 1, ...,k
n∑
i=1
piri (t) ≤ 1 r = 1, ...,k
k∑
r=1
piri (t) ≤ 1 i = 1, ...,n
n∑
i=1
mi(t) ≤
n∑
i=1
eli (6)
These inequalities are interpreted as follows: if t is the n-tuple of reported
types, then agent i obtains item r with probability pir
i
(t) and the amount mi(t) of
the divisible good. The total probability of allocating item r to some agent is less
than 1, and the total probability that agent i gets some item is also less than 1.
By (a variant of) the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, any substochastic matrix
is a convex combination of n×k matrices whose entries are 0 or 1, with at most
one “1” in every row and every column 4. As a consequence, every straightforward
mechanism can indeed be viewed as a random, feasible mechanism in the sense of
section 2, i.e., as a probability distribution over the set XS of feasible allocations
defined in (5). In addition, straightforward mechanisms never allocate two items
to the same agent.
Straightforward mechanisms can also be interpreted as time-sharing schemes:
pir
i
(t) is the fraction of time during which agent i uses item r. The feasibility
conditions state that no agent can use two items at the same time and that no item
can be used by two agents at the same time. This interpretation allows to recover
perfectly divisible goods. However, thanks to the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem,
we do not have to rely on it.
3. A “bi-stochastic”matrix corresponds to the case where these sums are exactly equal to one.
4. See Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) for a recent application.
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Expected utilities from a straightforward mechanism (pi,m) are easily computed:
Ui(pi,m|ti, t
′
i ) =
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)

k∑
r=1
piri (t
′
i , t–i)w
r
i (ti, t–i) +mi(t
′
i , t–i)

Incentive compatibility of (pi,m) can thus be derived as in (3).
Lemma 3.1 – Let µ : T → ∆(XN ) be a (random, feasible) I.C. mechanism for
the grand coalition in Eind. There exists an I.C. straightforward mechanism (pi,m)
which achieves the same interim expected utilities as µ.
Proof: By substituting utility functions ui from (4) into (2), we get
Ui(µ|ti, t
′
i ) =
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)
{∫
XS
max
r∈K
{
wri (t)I
[
xri = 1
]}
dµ(x|t′i , t–i)
}
+
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)
∫
XS
xlidµ(x|t
′
i , t–i) (7)
Let us set
mi(t) =
∫
XS
xlidµ(x|t)
Defined in this way, m satisfies the feasibility conditions for a straightforward
mechanism. Once we replace the second term in (7) as a function of m, the still
relevant part of µ(.|t), which appears in the first term of (7), is a probability distri-
bution over finitely many n×k matrices
[
xr
i
]
satisfying the feasibility constraints
in (5). Assume that for some t, there exists a matrix
[
xr
i
]
, which we still denote
as x, such that µ(x|t) > 0 and with several “1” in row i. This means that, when
t is reported, agent i gets several items with positive probability. Let r∗ be (one
of) agent i’s favorite item(s) at t (i.e., such that wr
∗
i
(t) = maxr∈K:xr
i
=1w
r
i
(t)). Modify
the matrix by setting xr
∗
i
= 1, xr
i
= 0 for r , r∗ (we thus first alter the support of
µ(.|t) and then, if necessary, adjust the probability values). The change does not
affect agents j , i (we only considered row i), nor the expected utility of agent
i at t = (ti, t–i). Furthermore, it may only lower the expected utility of agent i
at (t′
i
, t–i), since we have disposed of some items which did not matter for ti but
could matter for t′
i
. Hence, incentive compatibility is still fulfilled. By repeating
this construction, we are left with an I.C. mechanism, which we still denote as µ,
selecting n×k matrices with at most one “1” in every row and in every column. (7)
can be rewritten as
Ui(µ|ti, t
′
i ) =
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)

∑
x
k∑
r=1
wri (ti, t–i)I
[
xri = 1
]
µ(x|t′i , t–i)

+
∑
t–i
q(t–i|ti)mi(t
′
i , t–i)
We can now set
piri (t) =
∑
x
I
[
xri = 1
]
µ(x|t)
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(pi,m), as constructed above, defines an I.C. straightforward mechanism equivalent
to µ. Q.E.D.
An analog to the previous lemma holds for every coalition S, so that the charac-
teristic function V ∗ associated with Eind is fully determined by I.C. straightforward
mechanisms. Upon being measurable w.r.t. TS, a straightforward mechanism
(piS,mS) for coalition S will satisfy feasibility constraints similar to (6), by setting
pirS,i(t) =mS,i(t) = 0 if i < S or r < KS
where KS =
{
r ∈ K : ∃i ∈ S s.t. er
i
= 1
}
is the set of items initially owned by members
of S. Equivalently, conditions (6) hold with “i ∈ S”and “r ∈ KS” instead of “i ∈N”and
“r ∈ K”, respectively.
We will establish the following extension of Shapley and Scarf (1974)’s result:
Proposition 3.2 – The ex ante incentive compatible core of Eind is non-empty.
As in Shapley and Scarf (1974) and Quinzii (1984), the proof applies Scarf
(1967)’s theorem. We thus have to check that the game V ∗ induced by Eind is
balanced, i.e., that ∩S∈SV
∗(S) ⊆ V ∗(N ) for every balanced family of coalitions 5.
This is an immediate consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 – Let S be a balanced family of coalitions with associated weights
λS, S ∈ S, and let (piS,mS) be a (straightforward) I.C. mechanism for S, S ∈ S. Then
(pi,m) =
∑
S∈S λS(piS,mS) is a (straightforward) I.C. mechanism for N .
Proof of the lemma: Let us for instance check that
∑
i∈N piir (t) ≤ 1. The left hand
side is ∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S
λSpi
r
S,i(t) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S:i∈S,r∈KS
λSpi
r
S,i(t) =
∑
S∈S:r∈KS
λS
∑
i∈S
pirS,i(t)
≤
∑
S∈S:r∈KS
λS =
∑
S∈S:a(r)∈S
λS = 1
where a(r) denotes the initial owner of item r. The other feasibility conditions are
similar. The incentive compatibility conditions are linear inequalities and thus hold
for (pi,m), which is a linear combination of the (piS,mS). Q.E.D.
The mechanism (pi,m) in the statement of lemma 2 is not, as such, a convex
combination of the (piS,mS), S ∈ S. Hence its feasibility had to be checked. As in
the proof of proposition 3.1 (see Forges and Minelli, 2001), the previous reasoning
uses the fact that each good can be identified with the agent who initially owns it.
5. Recall that a family S of coalitions is balanced if there are weights λS, S ∈ S, such that∑
S∈S,i∈S λS = 1 for every i ∈N .
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However, in Forges and Minelli (2001), the grand coalition’s mechanism constructed
from the balanced family’s mechanisms allocates the different goods independently
of each other, which would not give rise to a feasible (straightforward) mechanism
in the present model.
Clearly, the linearity of interim expected utilities Ui(pi,m|ti, t
′
i
) as a function of
mechanisms is extremely helpful in proposition 3.2 but this is not the only key to
the result. As soon as random mechanisms are allowed, interim expected utilities
become linear in the mechanism but this does not ensure the non-emptiness of
the ex ante I.C. core, as shown in Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002). If economies
with random mechanisms are naively interpreted as linear, the exact feasibility
condition imposed on mechanisms in section 2 is weakened to expected feasibility
(see Forges and Minelli, 2001; Forges, Minelli and Vohra, 2002, section 4.3.2).
In the economies with indivisible goods considered above, expected and exact
feasibility are basically equivalent, thanks to the von Neumann-Birkhoff theorem.
To apply this result, we needed to concentrate on straightforward mechanisms,
and for this, we used the particular form of utility functions in (4). Whether
proposition 3.2 holds in more general models, like the ones considered in Quinzii
(1984) or Alkan and Gale (1990), is an open question.
4. T.U. Economies
Let us assume, in the basic model of section 2, that good l = k+1 is perfecly
divisible (let us refer to it as money) and that utility functions are quasi-linear with
respect to money, i.e.,
ui(t,xi) =wi(t,x
1
i , ...,x
k
i ) +x
l
i i ∈N , t ∈ T (8)
where wi(t, .) is continuous and increasing for every i ∈ I and t ∈ T . Let us further
assume that individual allocations in money need not be bounded below or above:
Ci =R
k
+×R (resp., Ci = {0,1}
k×R) if goods are perfectly divisible (resp., indivisible).
Feasibility obviously requires that the aggregate allocation in money does not
exceed the total initial endowment in that good. We may thus as well assume
that el
i
= 0 for every i ∈ N . For reasons that will be clear below, we denote the
underlying economy as ETU (we need not distinguish perfectly divisible goods
from indivisible ones).
XS can be defined exactly as in (1):
XS =
x ∈
∏
i∈S
Ci :
∑
i∈S
xri ≤
∑
i∈S
eri r = 1, ...,k,
∑
i∈S
xli ≤ 0

According to the definition of section 2, a mechanism µS for coalition S is
described by probability distributions over XS for every type profile t. However,
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since the utility functions are quasi-linear, the incentive compatibility constraints
only depend on the conditional expected monetary transfers. Hence we can restrict
ourselves without loss of generality to deterministic money transfers and describe
µS as (ξS,mS), where ξS selects feasible allocations of goods r = 1, ...,k and mS : T →
R
N selects feasible money transfers, namely
∑
i∈S mS,i(t) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, type independent monetary transfers are obviously incentive
compatible, so that the characteristic function V ∗ defined in section 2 reduces to
the following T.U. characteristic function:
v∗(S) = max
(ξS ,mS) I .C.
∑
i∈S
Ui(ξS,mS)
The ex ante incentive compatible core simplifies into the set C(v∗) of all vector
payoffs v ∈RN such that
∑
i∈N vi ≤ v
∗(N ) and, for every S,
∑
i∈S vi > v
∗(S).
For comparison, we also define the characteristic function v which prevails in
the absence of incentive constraints. In this case, free disposal of money cannot
be useful. Morover, if the utility functions are concave, lotteries are not necessary
either. Hence v takes the simple form:
v(S) = max
ξS deterministic
∑
i∈S
∑
t∈T
q(t)ui(t,ξS,i(t))
By the complete information results (see Hildenbrand and Kirman, 1988, for
perfectly divisible goods and Shapley and Shubik, 1972, for indivisible goods), C(v)
is not empty. If v∗(N ) = v(N ), namely if incentive compatibility constraints do not
matter in the grand coalition, C(v) ⊆ C(v∗), so that the ex ante incentive compatible
core is also non-empty.
Starting with d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979 and 1982), a number of
papers (e.g., d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet, 1990; d’Aspremont, Crémer
and Gérard-Varet, 2002; Crémer and McLean, 1985; Crémer and McLean, 1988;
Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1990) have identified conditions on the beliefs q
and/or the utility functions wi(t,x
1
i
, ...,xk
i
) which guarantee that the grand coalition
N can achieve first best allocations by means of an incentive compatible mechanism
with budget balanced transfers 6, which implies that v∗(N ) = v(N ). Hence these
conditions also ensure the non-emptiness of C(v∗). We illustrate this kind of
result with two particular simple sets of sufficient conditions (see Forges, Mertens
and Vohra, 2002, for further details and other results making use of the same
reasoning).
Proposition 4.1 – If in ETU the beliefs are independent (i.e., q(t) =
∏
i∈N q(ti)
for every t) and values are private (i.e., wi(t, (x
r
i
)1≤r≤k) = wi(ti, (x
r
i
)1≤r≤k) for every
i, t, (xr
i
)1≤r≤k), the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
6. Namely, (ξ,m) such that
∑
i∈N mi(t) = 0.
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The next proposition is established in Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990).
Let us denote as qi,i+1(.|ti) agent i’s conditional probability distribution (induced by
q) over Ti+1 given ti, where i+1 is understood mod. n.
Proposition 4.2 – If in ETU the beliefs satisfy
qi,i+1(.|ti) , qi,i+1(.|si) ∀i,∀ti,si, ti , si,
the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
The previous analysis applies in economies with perfectly divisible goods
as well as in the T.U. version of the economies with indivisible goods that we
considered in section 3.2. However, monetary transfers do not play any essential
role to make the core non-empty in the latter case, since it was already non-empty
with non-transferable utilities. More precisely, proposition 3.2 holds in the T.U.
case, and the proof of the analog of lemma 2 can be simplified by relying on the
Bondareva-Shapley theorem instead of Scarf, 1967’s (see Forges, 2004). Although
unlimited monetary transfers are not necessary for the non-emptiness of the core,
they are nevertheless useful to achieve first best solutions in the ex ante incentive
compatible core. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example
Let us assume that n = 4 and k = 2. Agents 1 and 2, who can be viewed as
sellers, both own an item, say, a house, and know, at the interim stage, whether the
quality of their own house is high or low: T1 = {h1, l1}, T2 = {h2, l2}. The probability
distribution over the sellers’ types is q(h1,h2) = q(l1, l2) =
3
8
, q(h1, l2) = q(l1,h2) =
1
8
.
Agents 3 and 4, the potential buyers, have no private information. The reservation
price of the sellers is ph (resp., pl) for a high (resp., low) quality house. In other
words, the utility from selling his house is –ph (resp., –pl) for a high (resp., low)
type seller. The reservation prices of the buyers are uh and ul respectively, i.e.,
acquiring a high (resp., low) quality house yields utility uh (resp., ul) to each buyer.
We assume that ul < pl < ph < uh and that
1
2
(ul +uh) <
1
2
(pl +ph) (e.g., 0, 9, 12, 20)
and that the utility of any agent is 0 when no sale takes place. 7
Since the buyers are not submitted to incentive constraints, we will, without
loss of generality, focus on transfers summing up to 0 throughout the example.
Let us first consider a seller-buyer coalition {i, j}, i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {3,4}. The seller
has then two equiprobable types, which we denote as h and l. We face a simple,
7. For a concrete example, think of the termites invading some regions of France. The qualities
of houses in the same neighborhood are highly correlated. We assume that mechanisms are designed
before the sellers know the quality of their houses, which is consistent with the fact that quality is only
checked in case of potential transactions.
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discrete version of Myerson, 1985’s “lemon problem”. A mechanism for a seller-
buyer coalition consists of the probability of trade pih (resp., pil) when the seller
reports type h (resp., l) and the corresponding expected transfers mh, ml from the
buyer to the seller (note that the transfers include the sale price as well as possible
fees). By eliminating the transfers from the incentive constraints (see, e.g., Johnson,
Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1990 or Myerson, 1985), the optimization problem of a
seller-buyer coalition {i, j}, i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {3,4} is
v∗({i, j}) = max[
1
2
pih(uh –ph) +
1
2
pil(ul –pl)] s.t. 0 ≤ pih ≤ pil ≤ 1
so that, under our assumptions,
v∗({i, j}) = 0 i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {3,4}
Let us set gh = uh –ph > 0. Observe that, in absence of incentive constraints,
v({i, j}) = 1
2
gh. Trade is indeed beneficial in state h, but the incentive compatibility
conditions prevent revelation of information from the seller.
Let us turn to the grand coalition N = {1,2,3,4}. First best efficiency requires to
sell the high quality houses, and only those, at every state of nature. Hence,
v(N ) = gh
We will construct an incentive compatible mechanism achieving gh as sum of
expected payoffs, so that
v∗(N ) = gh
As observed above, this implies that C(v) ⊆ C(v∗) and provides a simple procedure
to construct expected payoffs in the ex ante incentive compatible core. 8
Consider a mechanism in which only high quality houses are sold, namely
pi(h1,h2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
pi(h1, l2) =
(
1 0
0 0
)
pi(l1,h2) =
(
0 0
0 1
)
pi(l1, l2) =
(
0 0
0 0
)
The sum of expected payoffs from pi is gh. Obviously, pi is not incentive compatible,
but one can construct transfers m such that (pi,m) is incentive compatible. For
instance, the transfers m1 to the first seller must satisfy
–ph +
3
4
m1(h1,h2) +
1
4
m1(h1, l2) ≥
3
4
m1(l1,h2) +
1
4
m1(l1, l2)
1
4
m1(l1,h2) +
3
4
m1(l1, l2) ≥ –pl +
1
4
m1(h1,h2) +
3
4
m1(h1, l2)
8. The procedure can be applied to a large class of mechanisms (see, e.g., d’Aspremont, Crémer
and Gérard-Varet, 1990; d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet, 2002; d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet,
1979; d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1982; Crémer and McLean, 1985; Crémer and McLean, 1988;
Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1990).
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A possible solution is
m1(h1,h2) =
3ph–pl
2
+
gh
4
m1(h1, l2) =
3pl–ph
2
+
gh
4
m1(l1,h2) =
gh
4
m1(l1, l2) =
gh
4
The transfers m2 to the second seller can be chosen in a similar way. In order
to balance the transfers, one can simply set m3 = –m1, m4 = –m2. The mechanism
(pi,m) thus associates buyer 3 (resp., 4) with seller 1 (resp., 2) but sale only takes
place if the seller’s house is of high quality. (pi,m) yields the expected payoff
gh
4
to
each trader. The mechanism reflects that sale prices are influenced by the presence
of low quality items; the transfers in the low state should be interpreted as a fee
that the potential buyers pay to get information and avoid a bad decision. Many
other mechanisms achieving ex post efficiency can be constructed. In particular,
as in Crémer and McLean (1988), it is possible to design the transfers in such a
way that the mechanism is interim individually rational for the sellers, who fully
extract the surplus 9.
Let us end the analysis of the example by showing that the expected payoff
from (pi,m), namely, (
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
), belongs to C(v∗). We have evaluated v({i, j}),
i ∈ {1,2}, j ∈ {3,4} and v(N ). To complete the description of v, we compute that
v({i,3,4}) =
gh
2
i = 1,2
v({1,2, j}) =
5gh
8
j = 3,4
Hence, (
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
) ∈ C(v). It follows from our previous remarks that (
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
,
gh
4
) ∈
C(v∗). The same reasoning applies to (
gh
2
,
gh
2
,0,0).
This example shows that it may be better for the agents (in the sense of
generating a higher sum of expected payoffs) to stay together at the ex ante stage
in order to exchange information within the grand coalition. For instance, this
enables the agents to exploit the possible correlation between types and to achieve
first best efficiency through full revelation.
9. Adding (resp., subtracting)
gh
4 to (resp., from) all previous transfers gives the surplus to the sellers
(resp., buyers). All these mechanisms, including the latter, are interim individually rational for the
sellers. Another mechanism with the same properties is
m1(h1,h2) =
3uh–pl
2 m1(h1, l2) =
3pl–uh
2
m1(l1,h2) =
3gh
2 m1(l1, l2) =
–gh
2
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5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have focused on the ex ante incentive compatible core,
which is defined without any ambiguity, as the classical core of a well-behaved
characteristic function. As pointed out by Myerson (see, e.g., Myerson, 1983;
Myerson, 1984; Myerson, 1995; Myerson, 2002), it might be that no ex ante stage
is available. In many examples, coalitions do form at the interim stage. The main
issue then is that the negotiation over mechanisms already conveys information on
the agents’types, so that a completely different approach is needed. This problem
is still widely open (see de Clippel, Geoffroy and Minelli, 2004; Dutta and Vohra,
2005; Myerson, 1995; Myerson, 2002, for a discussion of the issues and possible
solutions; Forges, Minelli and Vohra, 2002, surveys most available results).
The previous difficulties disappear if coalitions form at the interim stage, but
cannot exchange information at that stage. This approach was followed by Wilson
(1978) and Vohra (1999) in order to define the coarse core and the incentive
compatible coarse core, respectively. The latter solution concept assumes that
coalitions S use incentive compatible mechanisms µS as in this paper. But coalition
S can block proposals from the grand coalition at the interim stage, namely as
soon as it is common knowledge in S, at that stage, that some incentive compatible
mechanism improves the expected payoffs of all members of S (i.e., there exists
an incentive compatible mechanism yielding a higher payoff to all types in TS
that are common knowledge in S). As a consequence, mechanisms in the incentive
compatible coarse core are interim individually rational (see, e.g., Crémer and
McLean, 1985; Crémer and McLean, 1988) and interim incentive efficient (in the
sense of Holmström and Myerson, 1983).
The incentive compatible coarse core is empty in Forges, Mertens and Vohra
(2002)’s example, both in the T.U and the N.T.U. case. It is non-empty in exchange
economies with linear utility functions or with divisible goods as in section 3.2:
both corollary 3.1 and proposition 3.2 apply to the incentive compatible coarse core
(see Forges, 2004, for a detailed proof of the result in the case of T.U. economies
with indivisible goods). This might let us hope that the incentive compatible
coarse core behaves in the same way as the ex ante incentive compatible core.
However, nothing of the kind is clear for the results which depend on unlimited
monetary transfers, as propositions 3, 4 and 5. Even the basic T.U. structure of the
model disappears at the interim stage (see Forges, Minelli and Vohra, 2002; Forges,
Mertens and Vohra, 2002, for further comments).
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